You clearly didn't watch the entire thing.

All of your points were addressed several times in the documentary.

In fact the ALPA rep they were talking to said in reference to the '250 hour pilot' about the 2nd event, "The kid did it right", and showed him flipping the cutout switches. They make specific reference to the 2nd event that occurred after the revised procedure from Boeing was published. They crew followed that procedure and still lost control of the A/C.

Boeing screwed up. The Max as originally delivered had a fatal flaw. We do not fly the same Max today.

IMHO, the Max is/was a terrible idea that was the result of Boeing being out maneuvered by a rival. The 1960's 737 should have been retired with the NG.

 

There are people that still to this day get exceptionally angry about him. I was jump seating on a SWA flight not too long ago and I mentioned something about "the website that will not be named" and the captain went off for three hours about him. LOL. Like the FO and I kept exchanging glances and not the "hey you look kinda cute in that uniform look".

I know pilots that will work with a Scab before they will work with Todd.

 

What? You mean the moron from American? The kid didn't do it right. They did not properly execute the runaway trim checklist memory items. All they did was flip the switches, there is a lot more to the checklist than that. Also guess it slipped Capt America's mind that they turned the switches back on to try and engage the AP several times, or the fact he couldn't manually trim because they were 70 knots into the barber pole (420 Knots well beyond the design limit of the aircraft). Kid did it right my ass.

 

Mark Forkner was not an Executive. He was the only one the DOJ found that did anything worng.

Boeing Charged with 737 Max Fraud Conspiracy and Agrees to Pay over $2.5 Billion | OPA | Department of Justice


The FAA knew everything about MCAS. MF didn't lie, he just said he did because he is a moron and that is how he talks.

Read through all of this to and ask yourself what is the FAA hiding?

CST-FAA-Aviation-Safety-Oversight-Report.pdf (leehamnews.com)

 

They left out the part where the Ethiopian crew turn the Stab Cutout switches back on after being unable to manually trim...because the airplane was going too fast because they never pulled the power back from the 94% takeoff thrust setting! Yeah, the did PART of it right...until the forgot to fly the airplane and turn the system back on. Minor details...

 

No, but he does have 25,000 in a 737 with the same Speed Trim System that MCAS is a sub system of. One of 4 sub systems actually. One of which called "high AOA". Biggest mistake Boeing made was calling it MCAS and not "High AOA B"

Speed Trim Malfunctions are dealt with using the Runway Stab checklist. It doesn't matter if the runaway is being caused by MCAS, TCAS, GCAS or Muhammad I'm hard Bruce Lee. It was still a runaway trim and the pitch trim switches on either yoke would override it. Running the Runaway Stab Trim checklist would have stopped it. The Lion Air Captain flew for several minutes just fine by trimming out all the MCAS inputs. Plane did not crash until he transferred control to the FO who never touched the switches. He transferred aircraft control because the FO could not find the unreliable airspeed checklist.

 

If the FO had not touched the switches, the crash might not have happened. He touched the switches (AFAIR) 3 times, for about half a second each, and MCAS replied 3 times with about 4.5 degrees AND, had he not trimmed, MCAS would not have acted up again. Obviously the crew did not handle this anywhere near competently, but I do think some people at B willfully tried to hide the extent of what MCAS was capable of from the FAA, and didn't realize themselves how bad of a design it was. The reason they made it dependant on 1 AOA as opposed to comparing both was to prevent having a miscompare annunciator, and another checklist, and that would have added training (on the KC-46 MCAS uses both AOAs, but for the 737 they took that out). Just one questionable practice to save money.

 

Not the full transcript but where was it that (ET302) they differed from the EMERGENCY AD?

At 05:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems.

At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly.

At 05:40:03 Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) "DON'T SINK" alerts occurred.

At 05:40:05, the First-Officer reported to ATC that they were unable to maintain SHALA lA and requested runway heading which was approved by ATC.

At 05:40:06, left and right flap position reached a recorded value of 0.019 degrees which remained until the end of the recording.
The column moved aft and a positive climb was re-established during the automatic AND motion.

At 05:40:12, approximately three seconds after AND stabilizer motion ends, electric trim (from pilot activated switches on the yoke) in the Aircraft nose up (ANU) direction is recorded on the DFDR and the stabilizer moved in the ANU direction to 2.4 units. The Aircraft pitch attitude remained about the same as the back pressure on the column increased.

At 05:40:20, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a second instance of automatic AND stabilizer trim occurred and the stabilizer moved down and reached 0.4 units.

From 05:40:23 to 05:40:31, three Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) "DON'T SINK" alerts occurred.

At 05:40:27, the Captain advised the First-Officer to trim up with him.

At 05:40:28 Manual electric trim in the ANU direction was recorded and the stabilizer reversed moving in the ANU direction and then the trim reached 2.3 units.

(First sentence of AD: Disengage autopilot and control airplane pitch attitude with control column and main electric trim as required.)

At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out "stab trim cut-out" two times. Captain agreed and First* Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out.

At 05:40:41, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a third instance of AND automatic trim command occurred without any corresponding motion of the stabilizer, which is consistent with the stabilizer trim cutout switches were in the "cutout" position

(Second sentence of AD: If relaxing the column causes the trim to move, set stabilizer trim switches to CUTOUT.)

At 05:40:44, the Captain called out three times "Pull-up" and the First-Officer acknowledged.

At 05:40:50, the Captain instructed the First Officer to advise ATC that they would like to maintain 14,000 ft and they have flight control problem.

At 05:40:56, the First-Officer requested ATC to maintain 14,000 ft and reported that they are having flight control problem. ATC approved.

From 05:40:42 to 05:43:11 (about two and a half minutes), the stabilizer position gradually moved in the AND direction from 2.3 units to 2.1 units. During this time, aft force was applied to the control columns which remained aft of neutral position. The left indicated airspeed increased from approximately 305 kt to approximately 340 kt (VMO). The right indicated airspeed was approximately 20-25 kt higher than the left.

The data indicates that aft force was applied to both columns simultaneously several times throughout the remainder of the recording.

At 05:41:20, the right overspeed clacker was recorded on CVR. It remained active until the end of the recording.

At 05:41:21, the selected altitude was changed from 32000 ft to 14000 ft.

At 05:41:30, the Captain requested the First-Officer to pitch up with him and the First-Officer acknowledged.

At 05:41:32, the left overspeed warning activated and was active intermittently until the end of the recording.

At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try.

At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.

(Last sentence of AD: If runaway continues, hold the stabilizer trim wheel against rotation and trim the airplane manually.)

At 05:42:10, the Captain asked and the First-Officer requested radar control a vector to return and ATC approved.


There’s is more to the transcript and it’s available with a simple Google search.

As for the rest of your points:

1. We all fly airplanes that were not airworthy “yesterday” Mx fixes them and signs them off. Same thing happened here. IF the maintenance manual included MCAS we might be having a different discussion. They followed the manual and returned the aircraft to service. AoA and pitot tubes go bad all the time who would guess that this 737 would be diffrent that the others that that technician had worked on for 25,000 hrs. (Yeah see what i did there) the amount of time isn’t experience it’s the knowledge you gain.

2. No idea what you’re talking about. Maybe stick shaker, AoA disagree, IAS Disagree Alt Disagree? They would have gotten a diff feel light and Speed trim but not until the flaps were retract so not sure what AIRCRAFT CONTROL warnings you’re talking about.

3. See above

4. Can you tell me what kind of training ET has? From what I understand it’s a lot more robust that a lot of US airlines do. (And rightfully so given where they are starting from) Lion Air - I’ll give you that they definitely have some things to improve there, and I was with everyone else the days after the crash thinking oh just another Lion air crash, until Boeing started dancing around MCAS.

5. Lion air pushed hard for Max simulator training along with the Malaysian regulators and others. In MFs words “there is no way Boeing will allow that to happen. They’ll go face to face with any regulators asking for simulator training.” Ethiopian CA (PF) had lots of 737 PIC time. Yes the FO was low time but I refer to the transcript. Does time matter if you did it right? How about the 18 landings at BUR in the last third of the runway? If the crew had lots of 737 time does that make it OK to violate FARs, policy and procedures?


A side note if you look at the flight data from ET302 you’ll notice the AP is engaged the flaps are then retracted at clean up. Before the AP disengage there is a right bank that the AP fights against. It’s only after the pilot disengage the AP to correct the course that MCAS activate. So what was the bank all about? The YD is part of the SMYS system the YD and turn coordinator work with variable rudder deflection based on airspeed. Slower more rudder faster less ruder. On ET302 the AoA heat light illuminated just prior to rotation (possible bird strik). The AoA values swing wildly as the aircraft accelerates and climbs. When you shear off a vain there is a counterweight inside that will act like a pendulum with no vain in the free airstream that counterweight will swing with acceleration or pitch change. This feeds big swings in AoA to the ADIRU and SMYD system. Most likely the YD just didn’t know what to do with these values and was issuing erroneous rudder deflection. (This is one of the main reasons every other regulating body got it right by requiring flight crews to put the CB and will require a stick shaker cutout before the Max10 is certified). These Rudder imputes overloaded the AP and the ET 302 crew was startled with Erroneous airspeed, a stick shaker, an Overspeed clacker and an AP disengagement with a roll to the right. All of that was quickly followed by MCAS activating. As shown above they did exactly what Boeing recommended at the time, just not fast enough.

 

Not the full transcript but where was it that (ET302) they differed from the EMERGENCY AD?

At 05:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems.

At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly.

At 05:40:03 Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) "DON'T SINK" alerts occurred.

At 05:40:05, the First-Officer reported to ATC that they were unable to maintain SHALA lA and requested runway heading which was approved by ATC.

At 05:40:06, left and right flap position reached a recorded value of 0.019 degrees which remained until the end of the recording.
The column moved aft and a positive climb was re-established during the automatic AND motion.

At 05:40:12, approximately three seconds after AND stabilizer motion ends, electric trim (from pilot activated switches on the yoke) in the Aircraft nose up (ANU) direction is recorded on the DFDR and the stabilizer moved in the ANU direction to 2.4 units. The Aircraft pitch attitude remained about the same as the back pressure on the column increased.

At 05:40:20, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a second instance of automatic AND stabilizer trim occurred and the stabilizer moved down and reached 0.4 units.

From 05:40:23 to 05:40:31, three Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) "DON'T SINK" alerts occurred.

At 05:40:27, the Captain advised the First-Officer to trim up with him.

At 05:40:28 Manual electric trim in the ANU direction was recorded and the stabilizer reversed moving in the ANU direction and then the trim reached 2.3 units.

(First sentence of AD: Disengage autopilot and control airplane pitch attitude with control column and main electric trim as required.)

At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out "stab trim cut-out" two times. Captain agreed and First* Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out.

At 05:40:41, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a third instance of AND automatic trim command occurred without any corresponding motion of the stabilizer, which is consistent with the stabilizer trim cutout switches were in the "cutout" position

(Second sentence of AD: If relaxing the column causes the trim to move, set stabilizer trim switches to CUTOUT.)

At 05:40:44, the Captain called out three times "Pull-up" and the First-Officer acknowledged.

At 05:40:50, the Captain instructed the First Officer to advise ATC that they would like to maintain 14,000 ft and they have flight control problem.

At 05:40:56, the First-Officer requested ATC to maintain 14,000 ft and reported that they are having flight control problem. ATC approved.

From 05:40:42 to 05:43:11 (about two and a half minutes), the stabilizer position gradually moved in the AND direction from 2.3 units to 2.1 units. During this time, aft force was applied to the control columns which remained aft of neutral position. The left indicated airspeed increased from approximately 305 kt to approximately 340 kt (VMO). The right indicated airspeed was approximately 20-25 kt higher than the left.

The data indicates that aft force was applied to both columns simultaneously several times throughout the remainder of the recording.

At 05:41:20, the right overspeed clacker was recorded on CVR. It remained active until the end of the recording.

At 05:41:21, the selected altitude was changed from 32000 ft to 14000 ft.

At 05:41:30, the Captain requested the First-Officer to pitch up with him and the First-Officer acknowledged.

At 05:41:32, the left overspeed warning activated and was active intermittently until the end of the recording.

At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try.

At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.

(Last sentence of AD: If runaway continues, hold the stabilizer trim wheel against rotation and trim the airplane manually.)

At 05:42:10, the Captain asked and the First-Officer requested radar control a vector to return and ATC approved.


There’s is more to the transcript and it’s available with a simple Google search.

As for the rest of your points:

1. We all fly airplanes that were not airworthy “yesterday” Mx fixes them and signs them off. Same thing happened here. IF the maintenance manual included MCAS we might be having a different discussion. They followed the manual and returned the aircraft to service. AoA and pitot tubes go bad all the time who would guess that this 737 would be diffrent that the others that that technician had worked on for 25,000 hrs. (Yeah see what i did there) the amount of time isn’t experience it’s the knowledge you gain.

2. No idea what you’re talking about. Maybe stick shaker, AoA disagree, IAS Disagree Alt Disagree? They would have gotten a diff feel light and Speed trim but not until the flaps were retract so not sure what AIRCRAFT CONTROL warnings you’re talking about.

3. See above

4. Can you tell me what kind of training ET has? From what I understand it’s a lot more robust that a lot of US airlines do. (And rightfully so given where they are starting from) Lion Air - I’ll give you that they definitely have some things to improve there, and I was with everyone else the days after the crash thinking oh just another Lion air crash, until Boeing started dancing around MCAS.

5. Lion air pushed hard for Max simulator training along with the Malaysian regulators and others. In MFs words “there is no way Boeing will allow that to happen. They’ll go face to face with any regulators asking for simulator training.” Ethiopian CA (PF) had lots of 737 PIC time. Yes the FO was low time but I refer to the transcript. Does time matter if you did it right? How about the 18 landings at BUR in the last third of the runway? If the crew had lots of 737 time does that make it OK to violate FARs, policy and procedures?


A side note if you look at the flight data from ET302 you’ll notice the AP is engaged the flaps are then retracted at clean up. Before the AP disengage there is a right bank that the AP fights against. It’s only after the pilot disengage the AP to correct the course that MCAS activate. So what was the bank all about? The YD is part of the SMYS system the YD and turn coordinator work with variable rudder deflection based on airspeed. Slower more rudder faster less ruder. On ET302 the AoA heat light illuminated just prior to rotation (possible bird strik). The AoA values swing wildly as the aircraft accelerates and climbs. When you shear off a vain there is a counterweight inside that will act like a pendulum with no vain in the free airstream that counterweight will swing with acceleration or pitch change. This feeds big swings in AoA to the ADIRU and SMYD system. Most likely the YD just didn’t know what to do with these values and was issuing erroneous rudder deflection. (This is one of the main reasons every other regulating body got it right by requiring flight crews to put the CB and will require a stick shaker cutout before the Max10 is certified). These Rudder imputes overloaded the AP and the ET 302 crew was startled with Erroneous airspeed, a stick shaker, an Overspeed clacker and an AP disengagement with a roll to the right. All of that was quickly followed by MCAS activating. As shown above they did exactly what Boeing recommended at the time, just not fast enough.

 

You’re understanding of MCAS as it functioned at the time is incorrect. MCAS would activate at a high AoA an run until AoA was decreased below a preset value (low Alt roughly 5.0). Use of the Main Elec trim stops MCAS then once Main Elec Trim is no longer commanded 5 sec later MCAS is allowed to run again. If he had not engaged the MAIN Elect trim the Stabilizer would have run the the nose down limit for that phase of flight uninterrupted.

Contrary to you assertion if either crew member had held down the trim switch continually until they were able to get the Stab Trim Cutout selected that would have stopped the movement of the stab. (Unless the were against the column cutout then they would have gotten stab movement in the direction commanded by the Main Elect trim until column force was reduce and they came off the column cutout)

I believe the KC-46 has synthetic airdata used as a tie breaker. Engineers at Boeing are on the record asking for that to have been added to the 737 Max after the MCAS activation window was changed to include low altitude / low airspeed. (I believe at least one engineer quit after a safety meeting over this and another fire warning issue on a different aircraft). Either way including a comparator between the 2 AoA might have required time and money but an updated Safety Risk Assessment should have mandated it. Boeing intentionally did not provide the change in the safety assessment to the FAA. They did explain MCAS to the AEG (aircraft evaluation group) but did not update them with a new Assesment as required or inform them that the MCAS activation parameters had been changed to include low speed stalls. The fix that took them 2 years could have been incorporated in the original plane with minor delays. BOEING chose to cut corners and risk lives. Then they doubled down on it after Lion Aio when they looked at the new data that showed 15 more crashes would be likely in the life of the aircraft. Boeing figured that with a crash every 2 years they could get a fix out before the next one…. They were wrong and it was other peoples lives they were staking their bet on.