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Originally Posted by acl65pilot
(Post 1123853)
I am not sure how you do not see me as straight with our pilots. My position on Scope, Pay, Retirement, and DPA has not changed.
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Originally Posted by Bucking Bar
(Post 1122974)
A friend wrote to ask about our 8K filing and what it means for scope. His point was Delta reported 21% of it's revenues from "Contract Carrier Arrangements" totalling $6.4 Billion on expenses of roughly $5.5 Billion; meaning a little more than $900 million of our operating profit was the result of outsourced RJ flying.
How do they know what the regionals brought in revenue wise? A ROA-ATL ticket is $860 on a CRJ2, a ROA-LAX ticket with a CRJ to ATL and then a 763 to LAX for $558. So of that ticket, how much belongs to the DCI equation and how much to mainline? Someone could claim the DCI brought the ticket to ATL so they deserve a large amount of credit but had there not been a 767 going to LAX they wouldn't have come on the CRJ in the first place.
Originally Posted by 80ktsClamp
(Post 1123035)
DTW in 1989 with some Douglas DC-10-40 awesomeness:
Originally Posted by sailingfun
(Post 1123107)
The company opener will be something on the order of a 2 to 4 percent raise with offsets in work rules to cover the cost. Anyone who thinks other wise is smoking some really good stuff.
Originally Posted by Sink r8
(Post 1123467)
He's suggesting we're not going to like the company's opener, and you're suggesting he's lowering our own expectations? Explain that one to me.
Originally Posted by More Bacon
(Post 1123478)
It's called sandbagging.
No way the company would offer something that low if they expect to have the contract done this year--as RA has publicly stated. So DALPA (through sailingfun, et al) continuously lowers our expectations and asserts that the company will open with 2-4%--and gets us to believe it--so when the company actually opens with more than that, it's basically free "negotiating" for DALPA. And it conditions us to think, "well, I did want 40%, but if DALPA says the company's only going to offer 2%, maybe I should feel lucky to get 10%." Lowering expectations. Problem is if everyone believes it's low and the result from either the opener or TA is double that (4-8%) then that's seen as a positive. This is kind of like fighting off vertigo while flying. Trust your instruments. Trust your demands. http://www.tangotienda.com/Leandro/C...et_0511835.jpg |
Originally Posted by acl65pilot
(Post 1123553)
Wait a minute. You flew with pilots on our seniority list that are part of the MEC administration? It can't be. Everyone posts that these guys just collect FPL and never fly! :D
So if FTB never flies, but sometimes he does, but doesn't collect FPL, he is definitely underpaid. Hows that for some rambling non-logic.:eek: |
Remember the staunch ALPA defenders that said how many new pilots would need to be hired with the new duty time rule that ALPA was pushing? And how the airlines were screaming about how much this would increase their costs? And the constant insults toward me by the ALPA types for focusing on the increases in our flight times?
Originally Posted by flyinpigg
(Post 1123873)
What’s Behind The Crew Rest Rule’s Lower Price Tag?
Aviation Week & Space Technology Jan 23 , 2012 , p. 17 Andrew Compart Printed headline: The Cost Of Sleep When the FAA finally issued a new crew rest rule for U.S. pilots in December—one that has been decades in the making and could become a model for the rest of the world—something was very *different from the proposed rule the agency published in September 2010: The cost. The difference was dramatic. In the rule as originally proposed, the FAA estimated airlines’ 10-year cost at $1.3 billion—which, it should be noted, the U.S. airlines argued was wildly underestimated and instead would have amounted to nearly $20 billion. But in the analysis the FAA provided with its final rule, its 10-year cost estimate was a relatively modest $390 million. Similarly, part of the reason for the higher cost estimate in the original proposal was that the FAA assumed the airlines would need to hire a lot more pilots to comply with the new fatigue-avoidance mandates. The agency never estimated how many, but American Airlines alone claimed it would need 2,300 more. The FAA’s new estimate for how many more pilots U.S. airlines will have to hire? Zero. This could account for why the U.S. airline industry has remained pretty quiet—at least so far—about the impact of the new rule. But what did the FAA change to lower the projected costs? Is it realistic? One factor—which is of no help to passenger airlines—is the agency’s decision to exclude cargo carriers from the new mandates. The FAA did not separately state a cost for cargo carriers when it performed the cost analysis of its proposed rule in 2010. But in its analysis of the final rule that excludes them—because the FAA says the cargo carrier costs would far outweigh the rule’s life-saving benefits for planes carrying no passengers—it estimates the cargo carrier cost would have come to $306 million. But eliminating cargo carriers from the rule does not come close to explaining the entire difference. The estimated training costs dropped dramatically, from $262.3 million in the proposed rule to $16 million in the final rule. Obviously, that is not solely because cargo carrier costs no longer are included. The figure also reflects the FAA’s removal of the proposed rule that pilots must receive additional fatigue training that carriers are already required to provide under fatigue risk-management plans. Together, by dropping cargo carriers and amending training rules, at least $568 million is now out of the estimate. The actual amount removed by those changes is higher, because the separate cargo carrier cost estimate is based solely on the somewhat less-stringent final rule. Even so, the difference between the 10-year estimated cost in the proposed and final rule is $864 million, so other factors must also be in play. One of them is the estimate for the new rule’s impact on the cost of flight operations. Under the proposed rule the estimate was $760.3 million; under the final rule, it is $236 million. In its regulatory analysis of the final rule, the FAA says inclusion of the cargo carriers would have added $240 million. That means something else accounts for about $284 million of the flight operations cost reduction. The FAA says a few changes in the final rule regarding crew scheduling “significantly reduce the cost to the industry.” One is that the final rule allows up to a 2-hr. extension beyond a pilot’s flight duty period limits for unexpected circumstances that arise after takeoff. Another is the removal of a proposed requirement that “circumstances beyond the control” of the airline have to be present in order to utilize the 2-hr. extension for certain unforeseen operational circumstances. The final proposal also alters the maximum flight-duty period limits for unaugmented operations. That had ranged from 9-13 hr., based on the time a pilot starts on a day and the number of flight segments. The final rule is 9-14 hr., with increases for certain start times within that range. For example, the maximum for pilots starting their day between 5:00-5:59 a.m. ranges from 10.5-12 hr. in the final rule depending on number of flight segments; in the proposed rule, it had been 9-11 hr.. For 6:00-6:59 a.m., the range is 10.5-13 hr. instead of 10.5-12 hr. With that additional flexibility built in, the FAA simulated the final rule’s impact by inputting the new limits and industry scheduling data into a Cygnus crew-pairing optimization system. Cygnus has been used by more than 30 major airlines worldwide over the past 40 years and remains widely in use. “The crew-pairing optimization did not show a need to hire new crewmembers to comply with this rule, because the flight crewmembers currently used in reserve allow certificate holders to conduct operations under this rule without hiring additional [pilots],” the FAA says. If that assessment proves accurate, airline management will sleep better than they had expected under the new rules, too. It seems that some math refinements and/or good ole lobbying caused the FAA to adjust their rest/duty/flight times from 2010 to 2011. No more hiring forecast for the new Reg’s. |
Originally Posted by Carl Spackler
(Post 1123891)
Remember the staunch ALPA defenders that said how many new pilots would need to be hired with the new duty time rule that ALPA was pushing? And how the airlines were screaming about how much this would increase their costs? And the constant insults toward me by the ALPA types for focusing on the increases in our flight times?
Carl |
Originally Posted by UncleSam
(Post 1123845)
I think you are incorrect about a PD adding anything to your RAW score. It's a day off, you aren't working or getting credit for work. You don't get RAW credit for X-days either. Now, a SC, that's another thing!:D
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Originally Posted by Rolf
(Post 1123882)
ACL, incorrect. Near-international is limited to 5% ASM. Far international is not allowed.
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[QUOTE=forgot to bid;1123887]Bar, you had a good post here I just have a technical question about the above.
How do they know what the regionals brought in revenue wise? A ROA-ATL ticket is $860 on a CRJ2, a ROA-LAX ticket with a CRJ to ATL and then a 763 to LAX for $558. So of that ticket, how much belongs to the DCI equation and how much to mainline? Someone could claim the DCI brought the ticket to ATL so they deserve a large amount of credit but had there not been a 767 going to LAX they wouldn't have come on the CRJ in the first place. FTB, Its simple, management can skew the numbers anyway they desire. If management wants to make DCI look good they would tend to inflate the revenue (within the discretion of generally accepted accounting principals - of course ;)) and minimize costs such as DAL gates, DAL agents, marketing, reservations, etc. If they want to make DCI look bad, just reverse the procedure. It seems to me there are a lot of variables and a lot opportunity for subjectivity in these claims. In other words - Just take their word for it. Scoop |
Originally Posted by Carl Spackler
(Post 1123872)
Your responses have been utterly politically motivated from day one on the topic of achieving gains to our profession. You change constantly depending upon the amount of heat you were getting. I'm pretty sure that's how DAL88 came to see you that way.
It only changes things if you start off making management's case for them. It will not factor into the NMB because we currently have other profitable competitors from which to compare. The same one you and the other ALPA apologists continue to ignore: End negotiations by accepting the SWAPA contract in it's entirety. It would represent C2K pay restoration and a scope section we haven't had for decades. The NMB would be hard pressed to say no to us demanding what our other main profitable competitor already has. But this all assumes DALPA wants this for us, and of course...they do not. This is why they won't discuss the SWAPA contract other than to distort what's in it. It's key to being able to blame the NMB as to why the TA is weak. Carl |
Originally Posted by Carl Spackler
(Post 1123875)
Not with regard to our scope section. That section opener CANNOT be produced until after meetings with the unions of our direct regional competitors. Do you need me to post that portion of the ALPA policy manual...again?
Carl |
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