This is perhaps the most shortsighted statement I have read from a colleague in some time. By colleague, I mean fellow aviator. By shortsighted, I mean thoughtless.

This accident affects us ALL. A crew had difficulty, and for whatever reason(s), perished as a result. We need to learn as much about this accident as we can, lest we be destined to repeat it. I’m positive this crew did not predict the outcome the night before, that same night, or even moments before the tragedy occurred. They were fighting their own battle, just like we all do during every flight. A sequence occurred, likely very rapidly, that the crew could not overcome.

Just like any major accident it becomes, more often than not, ‘too late’ before any conclusion but tragic results. This is why it is called an “accident”. We must study, learn, and train from every accident and situation to become skilled and competent. To be a student of accidents is to be well equipped.

The investigation may reveal a cruel defect in training, aircraft design, fatigue, CRM, etc. in which we may have all been guilty of or that which we all have been at risk to during each flight. To say this accident doesn’t affect you, well, you are not wise. To those lives that we lost, my thoughts are with them.

 

exactly. they have gone in circles with regard to fatigue being the primary cause of an accident. After seeing the facts put out by the ntsb i believe that it will be one of the leading factors when the final decision is made. I am not jumping to conclusions or trying to do my own investigation. I do believe however that the chain of events that lead up to the accident culminated with a long duty day and fatigue which would impare the judgement of any of us.

 

sandlapper -

I think you misunderstood FL450's post. He wasn't saying that the accident or mishap didn't affect him since he was corporate; he was saying that the following statement made in a previous post that talked about training at the regional level didn't afffect him because he was a corporate pilot and wasn't part of the GROUP that the poster was singling out:

USMCFLYR

 

BBC NEWS | Programmes | World News America | US regional airlines under scrutiny

 

USMCFLYR and FL450,

My apologies, as this is the result of perusing a thread and reading a post out of context. On the face of it, I read a short-sighted comment, but after reading the entire banter, I see the different perspective.

However, I still believe there are great lessons to be learned from every type of aircraft accident/incident and or scenario -- the reason: We are still around to read about them.

 

If you are referring to the Colgan accident, I'm sorry but I semi stopped paying attention until something formal is released due to all the rampant speculation, etc. But can somebody refresh my memory, did they duty on late morning or early afternoon on this particular day? Also, was it day 1 or the middle day of a trip?

 

The duty cycls of Marvin and Becky,as well as their complete life histories in the days immediately before the accident will be public knowledge by mid-week. Even though the NTSB will not pulish nor come to any findings or conclusions during this public hearing, it will shed light on many things we have been speculating about.

Of particular interest effects of cummulative fatigue on the pilots and their effective cognitive abilities at the time of the accident. I will be paying close attention to the expert testimony on this subject.

The NTSB will also hear some expert testimony on the training and experience of the crew. It is important to remember that all training, to include subject matter and syllabi, are approved and monitored by the FAA. The FAA oversight includes approval of all flight manuals and company ops procedures in effect on Feb. 12.

The experience factor will also draw some scrutiny and it will be enlightening to discover the cold weather operating experience of the crew and in particular Capt. Marv who recently transitioned from the Saab out of IAH. If the experience (cold weather) was lacking, did the FAA approved training fill this gap? Did his training include a tail stall? If so this could have been negative training as Bombardier asserts that the Q 400 IS NOT susceptible to a tail stall.

Hiring minimums and experience for a Part 121 carrier is governed by the minimums established by the FAA. Colgan, like all carriers, will hire the best that they can attract to their ranks through their screening and hiring process. So are the minimums and hiring processes adequate? Will the NTSB touch these subjects?

Blue

 

Great observation and point. It should also include the instructors and check airman, but before it gets back that far, they will cut off the paper trail and blame the individual instead.(its easier and less expensive that way) That's how it works! Not just with this profession but everywhere else, just to save face!

 

My opinion, is basically both. The guy failed 5 checkrides and probably shouldn't have been in the left seat. It's pilot error, lack of piloting skills, and deficient training. I'm sure he was a nice guy and it's nothing personal, but 50 people are dead. I find it kinda funny that I got ripped a new a-hole for saying exactly what these new reports are saying.

Captain's Training Faulted In Air Crash That Killed 50 - WSJ.com

 

THe director and manager of training have resigned, and several check airman have been pulled from their duties. THere will be scapegoats in this just like all outcomes, but I don't think the crew is going to take 100% on this one. I Seriously hope the NTSB makes a stand on the fatigue issue on this one. RUMINT has it that he had been working several "weeks" of Stand-up overnights. I guess more light will be shed on their schedules this week.