History of SCOPE at DAL (part-2)
 

Contract 2000 (aka C2K)Signed in May 2001 During C2K, leverage was finally in ALPA's court, so why didn't the resultant contract retain limits on traditional mainline flying? The answer lies in the complex negotiating environment at the time and the 1986 contract! ALPA and management were in mediation, and while ALPA tried to prevent the proliferation of RJ-70s, in the end, scope was relaxed. A primary reason was that RJ-70s were permissible under the 1996 contract (first introduced in 1986), and management made the case to the mediators that they were acting in good faith doing something permissible le under a previous contract and had spent the corporation's capital on these airframes .

The contract was ratified in May 2001. As part of the negotiated agreement, the decision was made to allow up to 57 RJ-70s (that were already purchased) with the ability to grow up to 75 (options associated with the purchased fleet) with mainline growth building on the 1996 metrics. New comparisons also were added,including ratio-to-mainline flying, hub-to-hub flying, mainline block hours, etc. These conditions had resets if things got economically bad at Delta Air Lines (and,in fact, were reset shortly after September 11). An MTOW of 76K was put into the contract, which for the first time applied to passenger aircraft. The scope section of our contract grew to more than 35 pages.

During negotiations in late 2000, Delta was losing money, and these losses increased through late 2001 and beyond. The Company's financial performance was fully disclosed during the Force Majeure 1 and 2 furlough grievances. Had the MEC not found compromise when it did with negotiations dragging out under federal meditation, who knows where we would be right now. One thing would be nearly certain:We wouldn't have had all the other benefits associated with C2K. Remember, five months after signing C2K, our world turned upside down . After C2K, the nightmare began with terrorist attacks on our country that turned the industry inside out and eventually led to LOA 46, a bankruptcy, and LOA 51. By the time almost all the negotiating leverage shifted to management, attempting to close the bam door was virtually impossible-the horses were in another county. The next eight-plus years were the worst possible times to negotiate anything, with almost all the leverage in management's court.



Letter of Agreement 46 (December 2004)


The reason Letter of Agreement (LOA) 46 was negotiated was that management was desperately working tostay out of bankruptcy. After several approaches bymanagement for concessions,which were rebuffed byALPA because changes were not required according toALPA's financial analysis,the MEC eventually deter*mined that changes were needed to respond to thefinancial condition of the Company. ALPA was again ina defensive negotiating posture. This was a massivelyconcessionary LOA. In the scope section, we moved theline again from a maximum of 75 RJ-70s with mainlinegrowth to a max of 150 relative to mainline growth. Italso moved the MTOW as it relates to passenger aircraftto 85K. Delta could immediately go from 57 to 125 RJ-70s. Still, there were no limits on the number of RJ-50s.The metrics from C2K were all reset (concessions)
recognizing the changing airline system. The leveragewas now in management's court with the Companylosing billions of dollars. Remember, however, Deltawas a much different airline in those days flying 765sdomestically, 777s to MCO, 757s up and down the EastCoast (Song).



LOA 51-June 2006 During Bankruptcy



LOA 51 included additional scope changes. During this time, we were in bankruptcy, we had an 1113c motion filed against us attempting to reject our contract in its entirety. Not only were we playing defense, we were not negotiating under the Railway Labor Act but under the watchful eye of a federal bankruptcy court, dealing with a creditors committee, a difficult finance market, and a compressed timeline. In LOA 51, the scope line moved from a max of 125 to a max of200 RJ-70s. In this LOA, 30 RJ-76s were permitted with additional RJ-76s dependent on mainline fleet growth. The MTOW was increased to 86K to allow the Embraer 175 (RJ-
76) to be used. The bankruptcy business plan relied heavily on massive international expansion, which management subsequently has done. The MEC and ultimately the pilots made the decision to accept these changes in Section 1. Many of the metrics used in C2K were reset again based on the changing airline business plan. The bankruptcy exit plan included significant international expansion, which was never part of C2K.

History of SCOPE at DAL (part-3)
 

LOA 19-June 2008

Letter 19 and soon thereafter, the Joint Pilot Working Agreement (JPWA) simply combined the language on RJs from LOA 51 and what was allowed under the NWA contract. The current maximum is now 255 RJ-70s/RJ- 76s under certain conditions relating to mainline fleet growth. Currently, management is limited to a total of 153 RJ-76s. There can be no more RJ-76s until the mainline fleet grows above 768 aircraft; currently the mainline fleet is 753 aircraft. The total number of RJ-70s
or RJ-76s operating today is 224.

Simply look at the number of pages of "Section 1- Scope" over the course of 20 years. One long sentence lasted for more than 30 years , then turned into three pages in 1986, eight pages in 1996, and more than 40 pages today. The massive changes to Section 1 have largely been a result of the aftermath of deregulation and decades of economic changes affecting tile airline industry. Most people think that Section 1 only deals with RJs, when in fact it deals with the more complex
busiess that our industry has become. The business models change and the companies tum into "holding companies" and ever more complex financial and strategic entities . Section 1 attempts to manage the flying controlled or contemplated by management. I suppose I might be called a heretic for even saying this, but Section 1 allows us to have a seat at the table when management wants to split up the flying- I believe the best and most effective job protection is a financially sound company that is required to sit down with its pilots and talk about the flying before it attempts to actually "split it up." Hence, the importance of Section 1.A-SCOPE, Recognition.

Context

The biggest thing to remember during any past negotiations is not only what occurred , but also the context under which it occurred. Who was in political office in Washington, the NMB, and Congress, etc? What were the issues surrounding the negotiations? What were the economic conditions of the Company, the U.S. economy, etc.? What issues were the MECs of those days dealing with, and what threats did they see on the horizon? As I have written many times, the last eight years-a quarter of a typical pilot's career- have been the worst time to negotiate in my 25-year experience in the airline industry. It is inappropriate to use current conditions to revisit old issues. We should learn from history, but it is not fair to go back and rewrite it based on facts today that were not known at the time.

Also, to assist with context, it would be appropriate to
put some info out there about the mainline fleet in 1996-
2004 and the last public info available, which is from
December 2008 . Following are the total mainline fleet counts (not including former NWA aircraft) for each June 1996 through 2002 along with the December 2008 fleet count.

Mainline Aircraft Only

YEAR FLEET YEAR FLEET
1996 534
2000 584
1997 551 2001 599
1998 563 2002 574
1999 583 2008 443

Complete breakouts by fleet type are available. Delta has reduced its mainline fleet count by approximately 166 aircraft since the high in 2001.

Anyone have a cliff notes of the ATL base visit last week? Any juicy rumors?

History of SCOPE at DAL (part-4)
 

Jobs and Scope

Context is appropriate in reviewing the job losses. Obviously, we have lost some jobs as the fleets have changed . Clearly, we have exchanged some wide bodies and actually increased the wide-body flying as we moved from three-pilot L-101ls and MD-11s to essentially four-pilot 777s . Delta converted all of the 767- 400s into international three-pilot airplanes from domestic two-pilot airplanes. We have increased the numbers of 757s with the additional 757ERs and more 737NGs . We lost over 120 three-pi lot 727s . Management also parked all of the classic 737s (approximately 83 airframes) , which held 108 passengers, and has not replaced them . I think a reasonable person could make the case that the 73s have not been replaced (mythical 100-seat airplane not withstanding) , at least in part due to the RJ-70 expansion. The loss of the 73s represents real job losses (approximately 1,000 jobs at six crews per airframe).

You must remember that under normal conditions, advancements are created by one of two things: growth and retirements. We had a tremendous number of retirements from 2003 to 2005 , most of which would have been occurring right now, so in essence many advancements occurred earlier than they otherwise would have been . Another consideration to advancement is the change to the age 60 retirement age-which pushed everyone's advancements back five years. Between 2001 and 2005 more than 400 instructors were pushed back to the line . As has been stated above, we are a smaller airline in terms of mainline fleet than in 2001.

It is important to remember some things regarding the "loss of jobs /stagnation " as it relates to contractual changes in LOA 46. The massive changes to the work rules in LOA 46 combined with PBS created large efficiencies for management. The reduction in headcount is due to increased flying with the elimination of the cap and implementation of the ALV. The reductions in staffing can be attributed to changes in FO recovery obligations for OE, reroute from open time, allowing to WS to the ALV+ 15, getting paid what you fly with-no next-month ramifications like the cap had, and the reserve RAW system.

Combining the release of the monthly cap with PBS and tile work rule changes contained in LOA 46 is a volatile mix that created stagnation and loss of jobs. Back in the C2K days we had more than 30 percent reserve coverage; now we average 12 percent. We have lost 166 aircraft (roughly), which represents approximately 1,900 jobs (a conservative 6.0 crews per air* plane) alone . Some are 737 related , some are not. The bottom line is that we are a smaller airline (exclusive of the merger) as a result of the downsizing of mainline. I agree that some jobs have been lost because the Company has not replaced the 737 classic-but are all job losses due to scope relaxation? I don't think that argument can rationally be made.

A couple of questions , which I fully understand will be controversial but must be considered, include : How many job s have we actually increased or kept due to the feed? Would we have taken all those 777s or 757ERs if we could not feed the flying, however management fed them? There is much discussion about flying the RJ-70s and above at mainline . That analysis demands a careful review and would increase the length of this article substantially. In my next article, you can expect that careful review along with analysis.

While many people insist the outsourcing of our flying with RJs started as a result of the 1996 contract or possibly LOA 46 and 51, by reviewing history you can see it really started back in 1986. Proper context, history, and understanding of the issues are important. I try my best to keep emotion out of my decisions and do business. I don't like where we have been. I sincerely hope we can restore our contract to what it should be* and, I believe , so does everyone I work with on the MEC and throughout the committee structure. I am very thankful we are restoring our current contract rather than the ones at UAL, US Airways , etc. There are horrendous things going on economically around the world and especially in the United States. Yet through all this, none of the really bad things that I was told were "absolutes" as a result of passing LOA 46 , 50, 51, etc., happened . We are still flying the MD-88 ; we have recalled all the pilots who wanted to come back; we have taken delivery of new aircraft, and we have hired over 700 pilots since bankruptcy exit. There have been opportunities to upgrade to larger equipment and/or move up a seat. Looking around a dismal industry, there is no other place I would rather be!

Disclaimer: I support ALPA, but I am critical of their myopic vision.


You do realize that it is DALPAs burden to build unity and motivate the nearly 1/2 of the pilot group that supports DPA to start rowing in the same direction. How, Shiz do you propose they do that. B!tch!ng here is not going to cut it.

Serious question. If they don't we will be looking back at the 4833 and marveling about the good old days. You said, "the DPA sh!t has to go away". You proclaim that it was decisive last time implying that they cost us $$$$ at the table and you state that going forward a divided pilot group will obviously cost us again at the table.

I'm going to state the obvious: DPA isn't just going to be gone one morning.

It is the job of ALPA and DALPA as our elected leaders to do the absolutely best effort possible to unite this pilot group in less than a year. Build bridges, mend fences, do whatever is needed to try and accomplish this.

But DO NOT neglect the importance of building unity, blow it off and then blame DPA. Doing so is a sure fire way to see a change of a bargaining agent.

Building this unity is fairly easy. It will take a major policy change tomorrow on DALPAs detente policy. But that is where the keys to the kingdom are. Get on it.

Our preacher was talking about the story and it was kind of hard to imagine one guy did that much in one lifetime and did it so long ago, and then he brought him out on stage. Mind blown. Heck writing the book on him was a heck of a story.

My wife got the book and could not put it down. I started but then the book went back to the library. I'll pick it back up.

I just caught the end of SD's presentation but here's what I remember:

-hiring much more than announced, but couldn't give specifics in public
-M88, 320, & 737 to stay busy this summer/short pilots
-trying to maximize pilot training thru put to ease being short on pilots
-M88 avionics contractor way behind; may be canned; we have to have solution; SD "bet his career" on this program; has confidence that it can be done
-There's lot's of stuff they'd like to buy to increase efficiency but only so much money for capital improvements; most capex $ going to new airplanes
-Deice expert from (somewhere in the N) coming to look at ATL; new deice facility to be built on north side of ATL in front of Renaissance

That's all I heard.

Remember "Restoring the Profession"? C2K pay plus post-strike Comair pay plus unlimited 50 seaters didn't seem like enough of a threat to replace almost all 73/72 flying. Delta was making 1B and hiring 1000 a yr. C2K would set the bar higher for EVERYONE and make delta the airline of choice for all pilots regardless of background. Passengers wanted off the Brazilia and onto a jet. That feed would fill ER's headed across the pond with a $300I a year captain in the left seat. A win/win. If anyone thought unlimited 50 seaters would drive 80 pct of NB flying into VCV it wouldn't have passed.

Then 9/11..and events unfolded as I previously described..

I got ever gooder news. First, remember "our customers tell us they much prefer flying on mainline airplanes rather than 34-, 44-, and 50-seat airplanes."

So anything > 50 seats is a mainline aircraft.

Now, according to the 2001 10-Ks of both airlines NWA had 428 ML and 36 Avros and DAL had 588 ML and 0 Jumbo RJs for a total of 1052 "mainline" aircraft.

We now have 588 ML and 295 jumbo RJs now, with the option to go to 325 RJs. If you say the 77 incoming 717s minus 12 DC9s plus say 325 jumbo RJs, you've got 978 "mainline" like aircraft.

Congrats! We're almost back to pre 9/11 mainline numbers!

http://i717.photobucket.com/albums/w...HappyDance.gif

Between this and knowing I can bid reserve and have guys fly for me and I can take a month off I just can't contain myself.

Hmmmm. Not that I can come up with a better place for it, but having to cross both north runways (and then back again?) for every departure would only work on a massively culled schedule.

Better than nothing I guess, but I'd focus more on at or off gate solutions. Taxiing the fleet north of 26R for every departure would be a gear grinding nightmare even if the facility was awesome.