I don't think it is an Airbus problem as much as some people like to hate Airbus. The fact is they have ab-initio pilots sitting in seats that can't fly an airplane without an auto-pilot. The common thread between this and AF447 is inexperienced pilots "operating" aircraft they don't know how to fly.

Shortly coming to a U.S. airline near you.

JetBlue Shakes Up Pilot Hiring by Training Them From Scratch - Bloomberg Business

Well, I think it really is an Airbus problem, not having feedback from the other stick. It's an inherent design flaw if one pilot can cancel out another pilots inputs without his knowledge of what exactly is going on. And I think once it gets out, it's going to be big. No agenda here, just looks like this will really cast some doubt on that architecture.

There is one systems question that comes to mind after reading this however.

If both FAC's fail, the rudder travel limiter freezes at the high speed rudder travel limits. Until the slats are extended you don't get full rudder travel back. So when the FAC's failed (or were turned off) they may not have had full rudder deflection to recover from an unusual attitude. I can see that issue coming into play. Even an experienced crew may need use of the full rudder travel to recover from an unusual attitude.

Maybe, but it's been part of the Airbus architecture for 30 years so it's not a mystery to anyone. Captain just has to push a button on the stick and he has full control of the airplane.

What if you are a 155 lb marathoner and you are flying with a 250 lb body builder in a 757? If the body builder wants to go full nose down, that airplane is going full nose down. In the Airbus the marathoner just has to push the button, the body builder can muscle all he wants and won't win.

It's for sure a different philosophy, but it doesn't just allow two guys to fight over an airplane and stay in an uncontrolled stall all the way to the ground. If that captain wanted to go nose down, he could have commanded full nose down if he was in a position to do so.

He did command nose down. And he pressed that button. Had the copilot released the stick, they might have recovered. But unlike in a 757, he had no clue what the guy next to him was doing.

I agree that it is more difficult to know what the guy next to you is doing.

I just read the full report and the captain had "slight" nose down deflection which did not cancel the "full" nose up deflection the FO had. Neither pilot pressed the priority button and the "dual input" aural call was silenced due to the priority of the "stall" aural call.

If that captain would have pressed the priority button on the side stick he would have had full control of that aircraft.....he did not do that.

The FO had 2247 total hours of which 1367 were in the 320. He started flying the Airbus with 880 hours total time. It does not say where he received his initial training.

This and AF447 are more about ab-initio pilots flying large aircraft that they don't know how to fly when the autopilot is off than it is an Airbus issue.

P. 61 shows clearly the Captain full nose down and the FO full nose up, with the aircraft in a stable but fully stalled state. The report says that the summation feature made recovery impossible with those inputs. Did he know that he needed to get the copilot off the controls? We'll never know. It really sucks that there isn't some way to see that you're cancelling out what the other guy is doing when things are going very wrong.

questions about the 'priority button':
1) If the CA has any nose-down input with the priority button depressed, doesn't his input override whatever the FO is doing?
2) If the priority button is held for a specified time, does it 'lock out' the other stick?

In the Analysis section 2.4 Side Stick Inputs, it says the PIC had a slight nose down input that did not cancel the full nose up input of the SIC and neither pilot pressed the priority button. Around P.107-110 on my computer gives the most detail on the side stick input issues they had.

You normally get a "dual input" aural warning when both side sticks are providing input. I guess the stall warning aural overrides the dual input warning so they didn't get the aural warning although there would have been a red dual input light on the glareshield (easily missed in most emergencies). I can see that being an issue and maybe should change to something where the stall and dual input aural warning alternate.

It is a difference in the Airbus philosophy for sure.

Still, just push the button and fly the airplane! Biggest threat for me as a PIC would be that my pal on the other side has 2200TT and was trained in a puppy mill on how to operate an autopilot not fly an airplane.

1) Yes. If the button is pressed, the last one to press the button completely overrides the other side.

2) Yes. After 40 seconds the other side stick is locked out.

If no button is pressed the sum of the inputs is what gets commanded. So a full up on one side and a full down on the other would give you neutral which would do no good recovering from a stall. The PIC here did not command full down so they had a net "up" command until impact. It's hard to really say, but it looks like the FO froze up completely and didn't do much other than pull back and hold on.